Doing Participation Well

This post reflects on Unit 6: Pro-poor politics II- Who sets the agenda?

In 2003, the Zambian Ministry of Community Development, Mother and Child Health (or MCDMCH, under which Social Welfare falls) began a Social Cash Transfer (SCT) program targeted to improve economic security of impoverished households, particularly those affected by disability. The basic format: each district elects representatives (Community Welfare Assistance Committees or CWACs), and they work to identify households in the community that meet the qualifications of the SCT program. Once identified, an assessment is administered, and once officially approved, the household receives a bi-monthly sum of cash via a mobile money system. Overall, it has been lauded as a successful program in the pilot districts, and is being scaled-up across the country.

I was invited to attend a Disabled People’s Organization (DPO) stakeholders’ meeting in 2013 in which the data on the program was presented by MCDMCH. My specific contribution was in regards to the methods used in identifying qualifying households. There were three specific criteria to be met:

(a) Residency – must have been living in the catchment area for, at least, six months.

(b) Dependency – a household is eligible if all its members are unfit for work. This is a household with members that are either chronically ill, people below 19, elderly persons above 64 years old and those that are disabled and vulnerable. We are also targeting households with a high dependency ratio (equal or greater than 3). This means that there are 3 or more people in the household being looked after by one person.

(c) Welfare – a household is eligible if its estimated welfare, calculated by the management information system based on a wealth index is below a pre-established threshold”

(5 April 2015 statement by Emerine Kabanshi MP, published in the Zambian Economist).

Residency and Welfare seemed to be appropriate enough qualifiers, however the Dependency qualifier seemed arguable from my perspective. First, the CWACs seemed to receive very little training on disability and how to identify a person who is disabled. Very specifically, I was concerned that the CWACs would identify households who included members with physical disabilities, and may not be able to properly identify those who included members with intellectual and/or developmental disabilities. I was also concerned about the ‘high dependency ratio,’ as it would mean the exclusion of, for example, a single mother who is caring for a child who has an intellectual disability, since the dependency ratio in that case is 1:1.

It was my suggestion, and the suggestion of many other stakeholders, that the identification process include DPOs in each district, and even allow for the DPOs, themselves to make recommendations of households they felt qualified for assistance. This would allow the DPOs to leverage existing relationships and community understandings to increase the impact of the SCT program.

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In this instance, I was functioning in the role of spokesperson for the poor; particularly the families Special Hope Network (the small NGO I word for) targets to serve. This is common practice for many civil society organizations, and is an important note when considering who sets the agenda for pro-poor politics, as this unit seeks to do. A theme in development theory and practice since the 1980s has been that of participation, whose aim is,

to increase the involvement of socially and economically marginalized peoples in decision-making over their own lives” (Cooke and Kothari 2001, pg. 5).

The editors of the above-quoted book, Participation: the New Tyranny?, actually seek to argue that though participatory development practices caught on because of the desire to decrease “top-down development approaches” (pg. 5), most practices have led to further “unjustified exercise of power” over the poor.  The contributors of the book want to move beyond a simple critique of methods used in the name of participation, and question whether or not the entire concept is worth sustaining (pg. 15).

In Hickey and Mohan’s (2004) response, the authors seek to re-establish participation by transforming the way it is understood and approached. They do this by suggesting the following approaches:

1. To focus on redefining methods and technical practices
2. To broaden the participation agenda
3. To seek altogether different, “radical alternatives” (pg. 12).

I recognize the value of the Tyranny argument; as the activity I wrote about above felt like a nothing more than a perfunctory wave of the participation banner: I do not know, nor have I heard anything about changes made to the SCT program after the DPO stakeholders’ meeting. I do know that of the 160 families Special Hope Network serves on a daily basis (all of whom I believe should qualify as beneficiaries of the SCT program), none have ever even heard of the program.

But I also appreciate the seemingly more practical and constructive argument of Hickey and Mohan. As a development practitioner, I tend towards these type of arguments (rather than those who err on the side of post-development), as they seem to provide more direction to those working right now in the field. Special Hope Network will conduct its own version of a Beneficiary Assessment (a specific participation activity developed by the World Bank) over the next several weeks, as we move into a time of organizational strategic planning. We want those whom we serve to have a real voice to speak into that process, and though it will be a difficult task to do well (as Tyranny suggests), it still feels to me to be a worthwhile endeavor (as Hickey and Mohan suggest).

Of, By, and For the Poor

This post reflects on Unit 5, Pro-poor politics: A politics of the poor, by the poor, for the poor.

The desire to represent one’s self and community isn’t a new or unique concept. The inherent will of the people to speak and act for themselves has shaped history; it is at the very core of democracy. The same idea has been captured by many (i.e. Abraham Lincoln, “Government of the people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth.” Gettysburg Address, 1863), and as this unit puts forward, is a key intersection between development and politics. According to the module handbook (pg. 68), donors in the 1990s put forward a new idea for decreasing global poverty- ‘pro-poor policy.’ States would have to specifically consider the poor in the development of national policies.

One specific way to do this, donors recognized, was for national governments to develop methods for the poor to participate in policy-making procedures. As Moore and Putzel (1999) argue, the type of government systems in place significantly dictate how this might be done. In order to reflect on the concepts of this unit, I applied them to Zambia, where I currently live and work.

According to Moore and Putzel’s classifications (Table 1 on pg. 6), I believe Zambia falls somewhere between personal rule and minimally institutionalized states political system. Personalities (for example, “KK,” the first president, who held office for 27 years) and the connections to them are still very important to how politics work and who has power. There are more and more services being provided to the poor through the government, but it is certainly patchy and mostly funded by external donors. There is a lot of “listening” to the poor, but at the same time, not a lot being done in terms of pro-poor policies.

In a DFID commissioned paper (2003), the authors identify what they understand to be the most likely drivers of change for the Zambian poor, and the most likely obstacles:

The lead in economic recovery in Zambia will have to come about in large part through the energies of individuals acting singly or collectively, and of the private sector. Yet much of the potential they represent is neutralised by wider constraints, many of which centre on the performance of government. This paper suggests that those with power and influence in Zambia cannot be counted on to do enough to meet the challenges of pro- poor change — enhancing broad-based economic growth, improving access to markets, services and assets, empowering citizens, and strengthening safety-nets. (pg. v).

This idea (in bold) highlights the central theme of this unit- the poor must be able to speak for themselves in order to see meaningful and impactful results towards both poverty alleviation and reduction.

In Whitehead and Gray-Molina’s (2001) article, measuring results of pro-poor policies, however, can be a difficult task. The articles argues it is too difficult to specifically match intentions of pro-poor policies with outcomes. “The poor may benefit as intended, not because of the pro-poor policies, but for some other reason” (pg. 24). If there is ‘success’ in the short-run, there is no way to tell whether it is sustainable or if it will proceed lasting effects. If there is ‘success’ in the long-term there is no way to tell which of the various factors that took place during that term were causal and which were not.

Someone has to be willing to represent and to fight for change for communities and individuals in poverty. Why not, as this unit suggests, those communities and individuals themselves? Next unit continues on with this idea…

Policy for the Sexy and from the Rich

This post reflects on Unit 4: International Influences on National Politics and Development.

As discussed in section on Unit 1 of the module handbook, Adrian Leftwich (2000) argues that to think politically about development, one must ask questions about power. He explains that politics is really about resources: how they are used; how they are produced; how they are distributed. The politics of development, then, is about changing these practices and the power relationships that exist behind and between them.

We live in a world where power, at least as we typically think of it, remains in the possession of the very few. The power in development, I want to argue, lies with the Sexy and the Rich.

Angelina Jolie with Syrian refugees as posted on Amanpour’s blog. Click image for more.

Ewan MacGregor during his Long Way Round motorcycle trip in southern Africa. Click image for more.

Emma Watson representing He for She, a UN gender equality organization. Click image for more.

And while there are several celebrity development advocates (above, to name just a few) who also feature in the likes of People’s Sexiest issues, here I want to clarify when I say:

1. sexy, I’m talking about issues. There are issues in development circles that are ‘sexy,’ and those that are not.
2. rich, I’m talking about donors. Rich countries like the US and the UK as well as rich people like Bill Gates and Warren Buffett.

As the holders of power, the Sexy and the Rich are have a unique ability to influence policy and social change around the world. In this unit, we read several blog posts (example here) about the pressure Uganda has received to reverse policies and laws that criminalize homosexuality. Right now, same-sex marriage, and various other gay rights issues are sexy (no pun intended) in many countries; countries that are also big donors to nations like Uganda. Activists appealed to these international actors, for example DFID, who announced the UK would cut all aid to Uganda if the “Kill All Gays” bill was put into effect (from the module handbook, pg. 55). Here, we see aid conditionality working to affect normative change in a developing nation. Of course, the ethics of doing so can be and have been argued both ways.

And then, there are development issues that are not sexy. I would argue, that in most parts of the world, disability is not sexy. For example I highlight the situation in Zambia, who is a States Party of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. In the UNCRPD, specifically in Article 25, it is written that States Parties will, “provide persons with disabilities with the same range, quality and standard of free or affordable health care and programmes as provided to other persons.” Recently, Human Rights Watch published an 80 page report on the inaccessibility of health care services for people with disabilities. “We Are Also Dying of AIDS” calls the Zambian government to do the following:

1. “Ensure people with disabilities can access mainstream and targeted HIV services.”
2. “Develop code of ethics for HIV services for people with disabilities.”
3. “Include women and girls with disabilities in violence prevention programs.”

The report also called international donors to “provide technical and financial support for inclusive HIV programming.” So, why hasn’t USAID stepped up and said “we’re dropping all PEPFAR aid to Zambia unless its HIV services become inclusive of people with disabilities”? I would argue the lack of any real action here is because of the un-sexiness of disability.

To link all of this with the Rich, we go to a 2011 article in Society, where Rogers cites Michael Edwards, the director of the Ford Foundation, to be:

concerned about the impact of philanthrocapitalism on social cohesion, democracy, and the ability of non-profits to respond to unsexy social problems (Rogers 2011, pg. 379).

Here, Rogers explains the emergence and impact of philanthrocapitalism, which she defines as “the use of business tools and market forces, especially by the very wealthy, for the greater social good” (pg. 376). She references The Giving Pledge, in which 40 billionaires from the US committed to give at least 50% of their wealth to charity, either in their lifetime or after their death (pg. 376). If Bill Gates and Warren Buffett (who spearheaded the Pledge) succeed on this, more than $600 billion will be given to charitable purposes.

The important question Rogers asks is this:

Should the global rich have more power to determine social policy for the poor if they agree to pay for it?” (pg. 378).

I would argue a very conditional ‘yes,’ they should, but only if they are willing to be influenced, themselves, by what research, data, good practice, etc. would dictate.

In his 2010 article, Edwards makes a stance against philathrocapitalism, however, saying “…evidence is not conclusive, but it does suggest that while it is perfectly possible to use the market to extend access to useful goods and services, few of these efforts have any substantial, long-term, broad-based impact on social and political structures” (pg. 247). Here, he is writing specifically about micro-finance loans and their shortcomings in producing large-scale structural change for those in poverty. I think this particular argument can be extended to his general view on philanthrocapitalism: it uses too many neo-liberal economic principles which have already been debunked as the answers to development success. For Edwards, the rich don’t always succeed in influencing policy.

The unit stops here, but we pick all these issues back up in the next two units, which focus on Pro-Poor Politics.

 

Auditioning for Center Stage

This post reflects on Unit 1: The Primacy of Politics in Development and Theories of Political Development. This unit’s primary focus is establishing politics as important, possibly even the most important aspect, when considering how development actually happens. To use a metaphor, if development discourse is a theatrical play, this unit would argue that politics takes center-stage. I would like to argue a slightly different idea, however; that politics is actually auditioning for center-stage, and does not yet have the spotlight. Let’s first identify who’s who in the metaphor- perhaps the play’s director is the Donor; bilateral, multi-lateral, whoever. The producer is Civil Society; NGOs, CBOs, FBOs, and the like. The stage manager is the Government. We could go on, but these are the big three that are present for the auditions. They get to decide the Actors of the Development Play, and each of their roles.  There are many possibilities for the Main Actor- and Economics and Technical Capacity seem to be favored, especially by the director and the producer. They have certainly had their moments in the spotlight in the past. During the neo-liberal days of free-market capitalism, Economics featured center-stage in almost every Development Play there was. Directors and producers everywhere were sure that this actor was the key to their plays’ success; and stage managers certainly weren’t going to argue. Structural Adjustment Programs in their day led directors and producers to focus more on the promising Technical Capacity for their center-stage player. Now that the shine has worn-off both Economics and Technical Capacity, though, directors and producers are once again considering Politics for their main actor. Politics used to be front-runner, in the days of modernization and dependency theories, but perhaps that is why directors and producers are wary of putting Politics back at center-stage? We’ll have to wait until casting to find out… – To move away from the metaphor, and towards more concrete ideas on politics’ role in development, let’s turn to useful quotes from the unit’s readings. Hickey writes in the very introduction of his 2008 article in Progress in Development Studies,

Has politics finally been put back into development? Optimists can point to several positive  indicators of such a return: witness the efforts to nationalize the poverty agenda through the country-ownership of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, the rise of ‘governance’ as a profession within some development agencies, and the direct efforts to integrate political analysis into development policy and practice (pg. 349).

Here, he points to tangible things happening on the development scene that lead him to believe politics is back in vogue. However, he spends the rest of his article pointing out why he’s not convinced. Specifically, he identifies the following red flags:

• Most hold very narrow conceptions of what politics is and how it functions. ‘Politics’ tends to be limited to “systems and processes” (pg.  350).
• Most still focus on financial and technical under-capacity of states; limiting governments to managers of development.
• Political scientists have not worked to “re-order mainstream development projects” (pg. 351).
• Development practitioners may talk about politics, but they dot necessarily use it in practice.

Unsworth, in her 2009 article in the Journal of International Development, highlights another red flag, particularly with donors and their hesitancy to put actual money behind realizations about the importance of politics in development processes. She argues that while more and more donors are tuning into the development politics conversation, very few are allowing the conversation to inform or alter their funding strategies. She points to “flawed assumptions” in both the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action (pg. 885 and 892) as specific examples, and outlines a different kind of donor-recipient partnership; one based on “better understanding of the political economies of both parties” and shared responsibility for problem-solving. Perhaps most helpful, and comprehensive, in this unit arguing for the primacy of politics in development is Leftwich’s “Politics in Command: Development Studies and the Rediscovery of Social Science” (2005). An important premise is this:

The rediscovery of institutions, and also, slowly and crucially, of politics as the prime determinant of their shape, returns the study of development to where it should always have been: at the intersection of social, economic and political relations” (pg. 595).

In this article, Leftwich takes a bold and firm stance based on the understanding that human societies are defined by their social, political and economic institutions. He claims the “story of modern development…is intimately bound up with the story of the emergence of the institutions of the modern state” (pg. 597), and that development is essentially a “political process, embedded in, and mutually interacting with, a network of socioeconomic relationships” (pg. 575). He defines politics as:

all the activities of co-operation, negotiation and conflict, within and between societies, whereby people go about organizing the use, production or distribution of human, natural, and other resources in the course of the production and reproduction of their biological and social life” (pg. 591).

This definition has implications for the politics of development, specifically related to relations between people, power and resources. Leftwich uses this idea to launch into a discussion on security and development, and then pro-poor growth (to be discussed in future unit reflections on this blog). Overall, Leftwich provides a helpful historical background and conceptual lead-in for this module, where we will learn more and more about the primacy of politics in development.